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In their four contributions to the Symposium on the Foundations 
of Intellectual Property Reform, Michael Abramowicz and John Duffy, 
Clarisa Long, Arti Rai, and Adam Mossoff offer a series of compelling 
and thought-provoking portraits of the administrative institutions 
charged with implementing patent law.  In some respects their con-
ceptions of patent law’s administrative state are in accord; in others 
they differ wildly and lead to contradictory conclusions.  In the brief 
commentary that follows, I examine and interrogate the central claims 
made by each of these authors and explore the ramifications of their 
variant theories. 
I.  PRIVATIZING THE PTO 
In their well-conceived and thoughtful paper, Michael Abramo-
wicz and John Duffy propose replacing the U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office’s (PTO) current monopoly on patent examination with a 
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competitive marketplace.1  Under their system, an inventor would no 
longer be forced to apply to a single government entity in order to ob-
tain a patent.  Rather, any given inventor would be permitted to 
choose among a variety of private, for-profit patent-granting firms, 
each empowered to issue fully vested United States patents as we know 
them today.  Duffy and Abramowicz envision that privatization of the 
patent process would provide the types of advantages usually associated 
with private enterprise:  here, better patents at lower prices.2 
This proposal will undoubtedly seem attractive to any observer of 
the current PTO.  Through a combination of poorly designed incen-
tives, a lack of necessary funding, and a type of capture by the patent 
bar, the PTO has come to be viewed as inept and inefficient.3  The Of-
fice is slow to grant patents—the typical examination lasts over two 
years4—and the process is expensive for applicants, who pay in excess 
of $20,000 per patent.5  In addition, the examination itself is not reli-
able; the PTO almost certainly grants many patents that it should not.6  
Any movement away from this pathological bureaucratic system would 
surely be welcome. 
Yet Abramowicz and Duffy cannot eliminate the PTO’s role com-
pletely.  The obvious threat posed by their system of privatization is 
that it might lead to more bad patents, rather than fewer, if private ex-
amination firms have no incentive to subject proffered patent applica-
tions to searching scrutiny.  Indeed, a system of privatization could 
lead to a race to the bottom, as firms compete for business from pa-
 
1 Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Ending the Patenting Monopoly, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1541, 1543-44 (2009). 
2 Id. at 1576-78. 
3 See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:  HOW 
OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT 
TO DO ABOUT IT 1-24 (2004) (chronicling the “devolution of the patent system”); Ro-
bert P. Merges, As Many As Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:  Property Rights for Busi-
ness Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 600-606 (1999) (of-
fering reforms to the PTO to address a patent system “in crisis”). 
4 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY RE-
PORT, FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 16 fig., available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ 
com/annual/2008/2008annualreport.pdf. (showing that the time from application to 
initial determination is 25.6 months and from application to final resolution is  
32.2 months). 
5 See Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Valuation Asymmetries 16-20 (Aug. 1, 
2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105184. 
6 See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 3, at 32-33 (describing a patent issued for a 
crustless peanut butter and jelly sandwich); see also Merges, supra note 3, at 589-90 (ar-
guing that the PTO likely “overlook[s] highly relevant prior art” when issuing business-
concept patents with an average of only five prior art references). 
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tent applicants by offering to examine the patents more and more le-
niently.  To cure this defect, Abramowicz and Duffy propose charging 
the PTO with overseeing the private firms that take its place:  the PTO 
would randomly sample the patents issued by each firm and impose 
steep fines against firms that issued too many invalid patents.7  The 
PTO could even go so far as to decertify any firm that was performing 
too poorly,8 much as Arthur Andersen was forced to relinquish its li-
cense in the wake of the Enron scandals.9 
But would the PTO be more adept in this new role than it has 
been in its old?  Abramowicz and Duffy do not fully address this ques-
tion, and the answer is far from certain.  In effect, Abramowicz and 
Duffy’s proposal redirects the PTO from rendering hundreds of thou-
sands of small judgments about individual patents to rendering only a 
handful of very significant decisions about fines and decertification, 
based upon the same process of patent examination.  Under the 
present system, the economic impact of a given patent grant or denial 
is minor because the average patent is worth very little.10  By contrast, 
each decision regarding whether to fine or decertify a private patent-
ing firm would be worth millions (or perhaps hundreds of millions) of 
dollars.  These decisions would impact more than just the firms sub-
ject to them.  Each PTO action would have substantial feedback ef-
fects, changing the way that other examination firms do business and 
altering the types of patents they allow.  The PTO would assume the 
position of a common law court, channeling thousands of private in-
teractions with each stroke of the pen.11 
It is conceivable that the PTO would function more effectively as a 
limited monitor than it has as a high-volume examiner.  The Office 
might benefit from the opportunity to allocate resources to a select 
number of cases rather than the hundreds of thousands of applica-
 
7 Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 1, at 1587. 
8 Id. at 1576. 
9 See Andersen Surrenders, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2002, at A6; Texas Board Revokes An-
dersen’s License, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2002, at C14. 
10 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 
1501 (2001) (“[T]he overwhelming majority of patents are neither litigated nor li-
censed.”); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 
1, 14-15 (2005) (noting the low value of patents as compared to lead time, learning-
curve advantages, and secrecy). 
11 See generally K.N. Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs:  The Problem 
of Juristic Method, 49 YALE L.J. 1355, 1376-83 (1940) (arguing that litigation arising from 
disputes causes third parties to channel their behavior, expectations, norms, and 
claims). 
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tions that pour in each year.12  With fewer examiners on staff, the PTO 
might also be better positioned to monitor its employees and struc-
ture its internal incentives.13  In addition, if each PTO decision has 
greater public visibility and salience, it might be more difficult for pri-
vate interests to capture the PTO and extract rents.14 
At the same time, however, there are reasons to believe that the 
PTO would function more poorly as a regulator than it has as an ex-
aminer.  The PTO’s few, more highly visible decisions might subject it 
to more aggressive lobbying, distorting its decisionmaking process.  
(The fact that each PTO decision to fine or decertify would produce 
clear winners and losers might heighten the amounts of lobbying and 
the resulting distortions.15)  And even if the PTO’s few remaining ac-
tions turned out to be more accurate than the typical patent examina-
tion, the magnitude of each decision and the fact that there would be 
so few of them would mean that the variance in outcomes might rise.  
The PTO might make fewer mistakes, but each error would hold in-
creased significance and—by increasing the risk and uncertainty faced 
by private parties—distort private behavior to a greater degree.  On 
this accounting, we cannot be certain that the PTO’s performance 
would improve, rather than regress, under Abramowicz and Duffy’s 
proposal.  Because the PTO would continue to play a central role in 
 
12 See Mark Gradstein et al., Collective Decision Making and the Limits on the Organiza-
tion’s Size, 66 PUB. CHOICE 279, 285-90 (1990) (demonstrating that an increase in the 
number of decisions an organization makes results in a decrease in the quality of each 
decision); Katsuya Takii, Limited Attention, Interaction and the Gradual Adjustment of a 
Firm’s Decisions, 33 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 345, 345 (2009) (taking as given that 
a firm can only maximize one input at a time). 
13 See Pierre Jinghong Liang et al., Optimal Team Size and Monitoring in Organiza-
tions, 83 ACCT. REV. 789, 794-96 (2008) (showing that a decrease in team size raises in-
centives); Anthony M. Santomero & John J. Seater, Is There an Optimal Size for the Finan-
cial Sector?, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 945, 964 (2000) (concluding that financial-sector firms 
may be better off limiting production and increasing monitoring). 
14 See Matthew J. Parlow, Civic Republicanism, Public Choice Theory, and Neighborhood 
Councils:  A New Model for Civic Engagement, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 137, 185 (2008) (ar-
guing that increased transparency mitigates the danger of interest-group influence); 
Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 1511, 1530 (1992) (contending that increased transparency guards against deals 
created between government players and interest groups). 
15 See David Luban, The Publicity Principle, in THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL DE-
SIGN 154, 186-87 (Robert E. Goodin ed., Cambridge 1996) (arguing that secret vote 
casting would decrease interest-group lobbying); Adrian Vermeule, Congress and the 
Costs of Information:  A Response to Jane Schacter, 89 B.U. L. REV. 677, 679 (2009) (main-
taining that increased transparency makes it easier for interest groups to influence pol-
iticians). 
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ensuring patent quality under their privatization scheme, the overall 
efficacy of their innovative proposal remains in some doubt. 
The potential problems facing the PTO as regulator of a private 
patent marketplace point to a more fundamental difficulty with the 
arrangement Abramowicz and Duffy propose.  The closest analogue to 
their structure is the modern financial accounting system, in which 
private accounting firms compete for clients under the watchful eyes 
of regulatory institutions such as the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board and the SEC.16  Importantly, though, these federal regulatory 
agencies are not the only—or even the most important—check on ac-
counting firm behavior.  Accounting firms and their clients are discip-
lined by the financial markets:  a firm audited by a less credible ac-
countant will have more difficulty obtaining funding on the credit 
markets and will see its stock price suffer (at least in theory).17  Ac-
counting firms should thus be able to avoid a race to the bottom; 
firms attract clients by developing reputations for credibility, not 
merely laxity.  If Abramowicz and Duffy’s proposal is enacted, there 
will be no similar market mechanism to discipline the examining 
firms.18  The entire onus will rest on the PTO’s regulators.  Over the 
past decade, the performance of accounting firms—and of risk-rating 
agencies, which serve much the same function—has hardly been ex-
emplary.19  It is hard to imagine the patent system functioning if pri-
vate patent issuers fare even worse. 
 
16 See generally REGULATION OF ACCOUNTANTS UNDER FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 
(CCH Bus. Law Eds., 1992); George J. Benston, The Regulation of Accountants and Public 
Accounting Before and After Enron, 52 EMORY L.J. 1325, 1344 (2003). 
17 See William W. Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence, 53 DUKE L.J. 
439, 441 (2003) (noting that Enron’s stock price sunk when the market lost faith in Ar-
thur Andersen’s ability to stand firm against the company’s management); Larry E. Ribs-
tein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud:  A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 53-54 (2002) (arguing that market-based incentives to signal ho-
nesty in accounting will lead companies to hire accounting firms with good reputations). 
18 Abramowicz and Duffy do propose—as a potential addendum—a system of pa-
tent bounties.  Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 1, at 1593-96.  This system, if it were 
enacted, might well serve as a market check on patent quality.  However, it could 
equally well serve the same function under the current patent system.  Even if PTO ex-
amination were shoddy, applicants would have incentives to limit themselves to valid 
patents and to avoid overclaiming for fear of having their patents invalidated by third 
parties.  The examination itself would be almost superfluous.  If patent bounties are to 
be the keystone against which the entire system rests, it is unclear what is to be gained 
from privatization—or even from examination at all. 
19 See, e.g., OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF’S 
EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 1-2 (2008), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf; Accounting Firm Fine a 
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II.  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PTO AUTHORITY 
Clarisa Long provides a comprehensive and rigorous analysis of 
the PTO’s recent efforts to expand its authority over patent law and, 
in particular, its own operations.20  As Long points out, the PTO’s task 
is complicated by its institutional rivalry with the Federal Circuit, 
which views any aggrandizement of the PTO’s power as coming at the 
expense of its own.21  Accordingly, the PTO’s efforts have assumed a 
number of different forms.  Some are conventional:  the PTO has 
lobbied Congress for greater legal authority and greater funding le-
vels; it has promulgated rules asserting power over patent operations; 
and it has litigated before the Federal Circuit (and in some cases the 
Supreme Court) in a series of attempts to carve out greater breathing 
space for its own policies.22 
More striking, however, is the Patent Office’s unholy alliance with 
intellectual-property-related interest groups and industry lobbying 
bodies—ostensibly the PTO’s regulated community.  Long documents 
in extensive detail how the PTO has appealed to industry groups for 
support in many of its endeavors, principally its efforts to lobby Con-
gress for additional funding.23  In these efforts, industry groups have 
been highly compliant.  However, their willingness to provide assis-
tance has limits.  No industry group supported the PTO’s petition to 
Congress for substantive rulemaking authority, and, at least publicly, 
industry lobbying groups unanimously opposed the Patent Office’s 
new rules imposing limits on the number of continuation applications 
an inventor could file.24  Amicus briefs from industry groups ran un-
 
Record; Probe:  Arthur Andersen Agrees to Pay $7 Million Civil Penalty in Case Involving Audits 
of Waste Management, L.A. TIMES, June 20, 2001, at C3; Ex-Accountants of WorldCom Inc. 
Are Barred by SEC, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2002, at C7; Greg Farrell, SEC Slams Credit-Rating 
Agencies over Standards, USA TODAY, July 9, 2008, at 3B; Siobhan Hughes, Accounting Fal-
lout:  Deloitte Auditors Are Charged by SEC in Adelphia Case, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2005, at B3; 
Karen Kaplan & Elizabeth Douglass, Former Andersen Partner in Global Crossing Storm:  
Federal Probers Focus on Methods of Accounting, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 21, 2002, sec. 2, at 4; Floyd 
Norris, KPMG Auditors Settle S.E.C. Case over Inflated Xerox Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 
2006, at C3; Jeremy Pelofsky, SEC Files Civil Lawsuit Accusing Ex-Sunbeam Officials of 
Fraud; Courts:  Alleged Accounting Tricks Led Investors to Believe that the Ailing Firm Was Re-
covering Rapidly, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2001, at C3. 
20 Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1965 (2009). 
21 Id. at 1978. 
22 Id. at 1977. 
23 Id. at 1987. 
24 Id. at 1992. 
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animously against the PTO when the rules were challenged in Tafas v. 
Doll, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009).25 
This strange confluence of assistance and opposition raises a pair 
of puzzles.  What could explain industry’s only occasional support?  
And what do industry lobbyists hope to achieve?  Long denies that 
they have engaged in any systematic attempt to capture the PTO—
despite the PTO’s frequent use of obsequious, pro-inventor lan-
guage—and suggests that the quid pro quo lies in the PTO’s greater 
transparency; it now releases substantially more data regarding its op-
erations.26  This presumably has played some role, but it is difficult to 
imagine that industry’s interests are limited to more information.  In-
stead, clues to industry motivations may lie in Long’s prior work on 
the political economy of patent reform. 
As Long (and others) have pointed out elsewhere, strong patent 
protection is most useful to the pharmaceutical industry, which relies 
upon patents to generate huge income from finite numbers of block-
buster drugs.27  The semiconductor and computer industries, by con-
trast, seem to reap very small rewards from patents on the whole:  for 
companies in these industries, the costs of navigating through oppos-
ing patents may meet or exceed the benefits of acquiring their own 
patent rights.28  Accordingly, these industries may even prefer less po-
werful patents and harsher patenting standards.29 
 
25 Id. at 1992 n.133. 
26 Id. at 1989-90. 
27 See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 88-89 (2008) (noting 
the high value of patent protection to the pharmaceutical industry compared to most 
other industries); JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 3, at 39-41 (asserting that patent protec-
tion provides incentives for drug development that would otherwise be uneconomical); 
Clarisa Long, Institutions and Interest Groups in Patent and Copyright Law 10 (un-
published manuscript, on file with author). 
28 See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS 
CAN SOLVE IT 160-64 (2009) (arguing that the software industry’s patent crisis is due to 
the ill-defined scope of software patents and the lax standards with which they are is-
sued); Leon Radomsky, Sixteen Years After the Passage of the U.S. Semiconductor Chip Protec-
tion Act:  Is International Protection Working?, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1049, 1054 (2000) 
(asserting that patents are not useful in the semiconductor industry because the com-
plexity of the technology makes obtaining a patent impractical); Robert L. Risberg, Jr., 
Comment, Five Years Without Infringement Litigation Under the Semiconductor Chip Protec-
tion Act:  Unmasking the Spectre of Chip Piracy in an Era of Diverse and Incompatible Process 
Technologies, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 241, 252 (“[T]he design that makes one chip’s layout 
better than another’s is generally not patentable.”). 
29 See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 28, at 162-64 (suggesting reform by tightening 
some of the patent requirements for semiconductors and limiting injunctive relief); id. 
at 160 (suggesting similar reforms for the software industry). 
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The behaviors of various industry groups map onto these distinc-
tions.  Many of the anti-PTO amicus briefs filed in Tafas were written 
by biotechnology groups, including the Biotechnology Industry Or-
ganization (BIO) and Pharmaceutical Researchers and Manufacturers 
of America (PhRMA)—the two most prominent biotechnology lobby-
ing organizations.30  These firms have the most to lose if the PTO is 
able to tighten patenting standards or increase the costs of obtaining 
intellectual property rights.  By contrast, a number of high-tech firms 
supported the PTO’s initial efforts to curb continuation patents, and 
the Computer and Communications Industry Association backed the 
PTO’s final rules.31  Seen in this light, the various industries’ support 
(or lack thereof) for the PTO is driven by the most self-interested of 
motives:  the desire to either increase or decrease the legal and finan-
cial hurdles associated with obtaining a patent. 
This set of facts suggests a startling (though tentative) conclusion.  
High-tech and manufacturing firms might be using the PTO to fight a 
proxy war, attempting to achieve through PTO action—tighter patent-
ing standards—what they cannot accomplish directly via Congress.  If 
this is correct, the PTO should anticipate a coming clash among pri-
vate interests over the future authority and role of the agency.  The 
Office may see its copacetic relationship with industry dissolve into 
factionalism.  (It is worth noting that biopharmaceutical firms do not 
seem to have been deterred from opposing the PTO by fear of retri-
bution; witness the amicus briefs in Tafas.)  If the PTO plans to con-
tinue in its efforts to acquire greater authority and resources, it should 
be prepared for increasingly overt opposition by segments of its regu-
lated constituency. 
III.  INTERNAL REFORM OF THE PTO 
Arti Rai’s incisive insider’s take on the PTO’s managerial prob-
lems32 provides an interesting counterpoint to Abramowicz and Duffy 
and Long.  Like Abramowicz and Duffy, Rai believes that the PTO’s 
performance has been subpar.  However, her approach to fixing the 
agency is decidedly internal.  Rai identifies a number of incremental 
steps the PTO might take to improve its performance:  recalibrating 
 
30 Long, supra note 20, at 1992 n.133. 
31 Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State:  The Patent Office’s Troubled 
Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2074 (2009). 
32 Id. 
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the workplace incentives of its examiners,33 adjusting the fees it 
charges applicants,34 and modifying its rules on inequitable conduct.35  
These few minor adjustments could pay significant dividends, Rai sug-
gests, if they substantially altered the behavior of both the private par-
ties who do business with the PTO and the PTO’s own employees. 
The hitch, however, is that the PTO can take few corrective ac-
tions on its own accord.  Only Congress can bestow additional fee-
setting authority.36  The Federal Circuit could alter its rules on ine-
quitable conduct or permit the PTO to set the rules, but it has shown 
little inclination to do so; otherwise, congressional action is required.37  
At the moment, the PTO maintains authority only over its own ex-
aminers.  The Patent Office has been entirely unsuccessful in convinc-
ing Congress to expand its powers, and, by comparison with other 
administrative agencies, it remains largely neutered. 
Abramowicz and Duffy might well view Rai’s analysis as a vindica-
tion of their own thinking.  Private enterprise is often more effective 
than government at providing goods and services, in large part be-
cause it is not bound by the strictures and vagaries of politics.  No 
congressional committee will tell a private patent-examination firm 
how to set its fees; the market will determine the appropriate figures. 
Yet Rai’s analysis suggests a number of counterarguments.  Abra-
mowicz and Duffy’s account necessarily posits a Congress willing to 
make sweeping changes to the patent system.  If such a Congress were 
to exist, would it not first be willing to attempt more modest fixes 
along the lines Rai suggests?  Accordingly, Rai might plausibly claim 
that Abramowicz and Duffy have attacked something of a straw man.  
Inherent to their proposal is a comparison of an idealized system of 
private examination and the highly flawed contemporary PTO.  How-
ever, the same Congress that would enact their proposal could first 
undertake the few adjustments necessary to improve the PTO’s per-
formance, perhaps to the point where a private competitor would not 
seem to offer such obvious benefits. 
In addition, Rai and others have noted that patent fees are not on-
ly important as a means of funding patent examinations.  They may be 
useful as well in curbing harmful patenting behavior and eliminating 
 
33 Id. at 2065-67. 
34 Id. at 2067. 
35 Id. at 2079-80. 
36 See 35 U.S.C. § 41(d) (2006) (limiting the PTO’s discretion in setting fees to 
minor issues such as “processing, services, or materials”). 
37 See Rai, supra note 31, at 2080-81. 
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social externalities caused by the proliferation of intellectual property 
rights.38  Private firms have no incentive to set these fees at optimal le-
vels; action by Congress would be required.  And if Congress is to re-
main such an active partner in the patent-examination process, who is 
to say that the results will be better in a world of private examinations 
than under the current system? 
Here, Long’s contribution is perhaps instructive.  Any proposed 
change to the PTO involving well-understood increases or decreases 
in the cost of obtaining a patent—and thus obvious winners and los-
ers—will undoubtedly catalyze opposition from one industry or 
another.39  Even the incremental steps that Rai proposes might there-
fore be difficult to implement.  Systemic change with uncertain con-
sequences, like Abramowicz and Duffy’s proposal, might (counter-
intuitively) be easier.  However, the follow-on regulation necessary if 
privatization is to succeed could again be difficult.  The result may be 
a shift from a world of second-best bureaucratic examination to a 
world of second-best private examination.  Much more research is ne-
cessary before a definitive course forward can emerge, but these three 
papers have made an excellent start along that path. 
IV.  LOCKEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Finally, in his interesting and provocative contribution, Adam 
Mossoff offers a new defense of Lockean property theory40 against the 
charge of circularity leveled against it more than seventy years ago by 
Felix Cohen.41  According to Cohen, it is incoherent for judges or leg-
islators to base decisions whether or not to afford property protection 
to some item or idea based on whether that item or idea holds value.  
Value, Cohen pointed out, is a consequence of government protection—
e.g., a book is worth little to me if anyone in the world can steal it at 
any moment—not an antecedent.42  Mossoff observes correctly that 
much of the modern administrative state was founded upon precisely 
this theoretical framework.43  If value is purely a function of govern-
ment action rather than a quantity intrinsic to individuals and objects, 
 
38 Id. at 2068. 
39 See Long, supra note 20, at 1990. 
40 Adam Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Administrative State, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 2001 (2009). 
41 See Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357 (1954). 
42 See id. at 378  
43 See Mossoff, supra note 41, at 2005. 
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then government is justified in a far broader range of actions that di-
minish or redistribute value. 
Mossoff claims that Cohen’s mistake lay in equating “value,” as 
Locke meant the word, with the concept of “wealth,” in a market-
based sense.44  Mossoff argues that Locke understood value quite dif-
ferently:  goods or ideas are valuable if “they ma[k]e both life and 
happiness possible, as the production of such goods is what makes it 
possible for humans to live and flourish.”45  Accordingly, an idea 
might have value to an individual (or to society), even if it is freely 
available and no one would pay to obtain it, as long as it improves that 
person’s life (or the welfare of society as a whole).  If value in this sense 
does not depend upon governmental protection of property rights, the 
Lockean circle is broken and Cohen’s critique misses the mark. 
If Mossoff’s novel approach is correct, it holds the potential to re-
suscitate Lockean property theory and open new avenues of inquiry.  
But a number of problems immediately present themselves.  First, this 
conception of “value” has a tenuous relationship with the input of la-
bor, the touchstone of Lockean property theory.46  Locke viewed the 
addition of labor as a necessary condition for the production of val-
ue.47  By Mossoff’s formulation, however, there are goods that have 
value absent any labor—fresh air and sunshine, for instance.  There is 
thus some reason to be skeptical of Mossoff’s reading of Locke. 
Second, and more importantly, even if Mossoff is correct, it is far 
from clear that Cohen’s original argument must fail.  An item or idea 
may have value in an abstract sense absent property-like protection, 
but it has no value to an individual—even in Mossoff’s terms—without 
some set of enforceable rights (or the equivalent).  Sunlight is worth-
less to me if I cannot prevent you from obscuring it; the ideas behind 
the computer have no value if you will steal any computer I purchase 
or construct (or anything produced using a computer).  Mossoff sug-
gests a variety of cases in which people have held valuable commodi-
ties absent any formal property protections, including the famous 
Shasta ranchers and illegal black-market tradesmen.48  In these cases, 
however, some type of self-help or transaction cost—the promise of 
reciprocation or retaliation among the ranchers or the threat of vi-
 
44 Id. at 2031. 
45 Id. 
46 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 305-06 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988) (1690). 
47 Id. 
48 Mossoff, supra note 41, at 2038-39. 
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olence among those in the black market—substitutes for legal proper-
ty rights.  At bottom, the individual must possess some means of secur-
ing the item; property rights are merely the cheapest and most com-
mon of these means. 
Finally, even if Mossoff were correct, it is not clear what conse-
quences his theory implies or what aspect of the administrative state 
might have to be rethought.  Mossoff, to his credit, explicitly disclaims 
any normative conclusions,49 and to pursue this question is to push 
beyond the point Mossoff himself intended.  Nonetheless, normative 
questions present themselves.  If inventors create value through their 
inventions, what follows?  The question facing a state interested in the 
welfare of its citizens will always be whether or not to layer on property 
protections—whether doing so will enhance or diminish the overall 
well-being of the citizenry.  Lockean property theory, even as cleverly 
reconceptualized by Mossoff, has little to say on this point. 
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